Military Education Coordination Council

2007 Special Areas of Emphasis Assessment

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Agenda

- SAE Definition/Process
- 2006 approved and 2007 nominated SAE Laydown

SAE Definition and Pr

SAE's highlight the concerns of OSD, the Services, combatant commands, Defense Agencies and the Joint Staff regarding cov of specific joint subject matter in the PME colleges. They help the currency and relevance of the colleges' JPME curricula and an independent view of what those curricula should address.

Up to ten SAEs are formulated annually and approved by the C

Process: 1) Submit SAE nominations with justification for rev
2) JFEC review; forward initial assessment to Fall MEC Working Grp
3) MECC Working Group review; forward to MECC
4) MECC review; forward for CJCS approval.
5) Approved SAE list is distributed to the joint and college and schools annually during January

Note: Colleges and schools will evaluate each SAE and, where they d feasible and appropriate, incorporate them in their curricula; howeve inclusion is not required.

MECC WG 2007 SAE Asses

2006 APPROVED SAEs	NOMINATED SAEs FOR 2007
1 COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (JOINT STAFF/ J5)	1 COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (JOINT STAFF/ J5)
2 OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA) (JFCOM))	2 MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION (MULTIPLE)
3 EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING/EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBP/EBO) (JFCOM)	3 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (ONA) (JFCOM
4 HOMELAND SECURITY (USNORTHCOM)	4 IRREGULAR WARFARE (JS J3)
5 MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION (MULTIPLE)	
6 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (GFM) (JOINT STAFF J3)	
7 JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS/ DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER	

Approved 2006 SAE's

MECC WG 2007 SAE nominations

UNCLASS

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Description:

The concept of Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism (CIST) is integral to the USG and military strategy for the War on Terrorism (see NMSP-WOT). CIST erodes the appeal of extremist ideology, the enemy's strategic center of gravity. All military members should have an understanding of the principle framework of the GWOT strategy, including CIST. JPME curricula should challenge students to investigate the five elements of DOD's role in CIST (security, information operations, humanitarian support, military to military contacts and conduct of operations) and provide students with an awareness of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of the enemy. This will allow future leaders to more effectively counter the extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing cover for them to operate within their society.

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (Cont)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Description (Cont.):

Security. The U.S. Armed Forces and indigenous forces provide security as a critical condition for countering extremist ideologies. A secure environment prevents a culture of violence from emerging that feeds the radicalization process. Security is also a precondition for the success of humanitarian assistance and the counter ideology efforts of other government agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.

Military Information Operations. DOD can support efforts to facilitate introspection within Muslim society that rejects violent extremism. It can also support countering the radicalization message of extremist groups. These operations are coordinated with other departments and agencies, principally the State Department, as a component of DOD's contribution to Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications.

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (Cont)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Military Contributions to CIST (cont.):

Humanitarian Assistance. The considerable capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to alleviate suffering in times of hardship provide opportunities to influence the way people perceive their situation and environment, and how they perceive the US Government. These efforts are often key to demonstrating goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause.

Military-to-Military contacts. The military's extensive footprint and access to foreign military leaders influence the way they think about the GWOT and the actions they take to counter extremists and promote non-violence. The contacts include: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Offices of Military Cooperation and other train-and-equip efforts, foreign participation in Regional Centers, combined training activities and exercises, and senior military contacts.

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (Cont)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Military Contributions to CIST (cont.):

Conduct of Operations. The way we conduct operations—choosing whether, when, where, and how—can affect ideological support for terrorism. Knowledge of the indigenous population's cultural and religious sensitivities, and understanding how extremists portray the U.S. military's actions as attacking the indigenous population, should inform the way the U.S. military operates. Where effects can be achieved by means other than direct U.S. military actions, the U.S. Government may seek to do so. Where U.S. military involvement is necessary, military planners should build efforts into the operation to reduce potential negative effects. At the same time, we must, by our military actions, convey the sense that our power cannot be defeated, and that under the right circumstances, we are willing to use it. This will require careful balancing. The conduct of military operations should avoid undercutting the credibility and legitimacy of indigenous authorities opposed to the extremists, while defeating the extremist's ability to spread their ideology.

SAE #2 Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff J-5
Description:

SSTRO is defined as Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. Initial guidance has been codified in DoD Directive 3000.05 (approved 28 Nov 2005), "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations." This document establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. Current focus is on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop, while future guidance will address the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoD's role in each. Executing the National Security Strategy involves engaging crises with a variety of responses including stability operations.

SAE #3 Operational Net Assessm

Submitting Agency: USJFCOM
Description:

Operational Net Assessment (ONA) is an integrated process that enhances planning and execution. It is plans and operations centric and includes information and intelligence inputs. ONA integrates people, processes and tools using multiple information sources and collaboration to build and maintain a shared, common, relevant understanding of the operational environment. JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of: 1) how ONA development is a continuous process that synthesizes and integrates information from across commands, the interagency, coalition communities, and other communities of interest into actionable knowledge;
2) how it incorporates a comprehensive and integrated system-of-systems understanding of the operational environment; 3) that the principal product of the ONA is a pre-analyzed range or menu of options in the form of effect-node-action-resource linkages that reside in an automated knowledge base; and
4) that from these options, planners can select specific linkages to develop courses of action in order to help the commander focus capabilities to produce decisive effects within available timelines. JPME should provide the education needed by joint officers to understand the

SAE #4 Irregular Warfare

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff J-3

Description:

The current proposed Irregular Warfare definition reads as follows: "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population." Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary's power influence, and will." What differentiates IW from other forms of warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular forces, and other indirect, non-conventional methods, to subvert, attrite, or exhaust an enemy rather than to defeat him through direct, conventional military confrontation. Common characteristics of irregular warfare include protraction, intertwining military and non-military methods, participation by violent individuals and groups that do not belong to the regular armed forces or police of any state and a struggle for control or influence over, and the support of the host population. Tactical and operational competence in conventional warfighting does not necessarily guarantee tactical, operational, or strategic success in operations and activities associated with IW. IW extends beyond the military domain and incorporates political, psychological, informational and economic methods, which are enabled and supported by the actions of military and other security forces. JPME curricula should focus on the joint, multinational and interagency nature of IW and highlight the both the military and political